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COMMENT
JUVENILE IN JUSTICE: A LOOK AT MARYLAND’S PRACTICE
OF INCARCERATING CHILDREN WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL
KELSEY ROBINSON *
A juvenile “receives the worst of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.” 1

In Maryland, if Shane is arrested and charged the day before his
eighteenth birthday with malicious destruction of property for throwing a
rock at a vehicle, he will be adjudicated as a delinquent. 2 In this case, Shane
is not entitled to a jury trial. 3 However, if Shane is arrested for this same
crime on the day of his eighteenth birthday, then he will be charged as an
adult 4 and is entitled to a jury trial because the offense he is charged with
permits imprisonment for a period of more than ninety days. 5 Yet Shane—
merely because he is considered a juvenile for the charge when he is
seventeen years, 364-days-old—is not afforded the protection of a jury trial
if he is charged before his birthday. 6 Since the juvenile court has jurisdiction
over Shane until he is twenty-one-years-old, Shane faces a possible period of
incarceration of three years when adjudicated delinquent. 7 Yet when charged
as an adult, Shane faces a period of incarceration that is at most one year. 8
© 2020 Kelsey Robinson.
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank the editors of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Andrew White, Lauren
Fash, and Bianca Spinosa for their dedication to editing this paper. She thanks Professor David
Gray for being her faculty advisor and sharing his insights and knowledge. Finally, the author
would like to dedicate this Comment to her parents, Craig and Connie Robinson, for their
unwavering love and support.
1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
2. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03 (West 2011) (excluding malicious
destruction of property as a crime under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction).
3. See id. § 3-8A-13(g) (“The court shall try cases without a jury.”).
4. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-302 (West 2002).
5. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2). In the adult criminal system, a person convicted of
malicious destruction of property for throwing an object at a vehicle faces up to one-year
incarceration. CRIM. LAW § 6-302.
6. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(c)–(d) (defining an adult as “an individual who is at
least [eighteen] years old” and a child as “an individual under the age of [eighteen] years”).
7. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-24.
8. CRIM. LAW § 6-302(b).
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This Comment will argue that because juveniles adjudicated delinquent
in Maryland are subject to incarceration upon disposition and thus at risk of
losing their liberty, they are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. Depriving
juveniles the right to a jury trial violates Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, which specifies “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions,
every man hath a right to . . . trial by an impartial jury.” 9 It also violates
Article 24, which states that “no man ought to be . . . imprisoned or disseized
of his freehold liberties . . . or, in any manner, . . . deprived of his . . .
liberty . . . but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” 10
Because juveniles are deprived of their liberty when they are, in effect,
prosecuted and incarcerated, they are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial
under the Declaration of Rights. 11
Part I of this Comment will discuss the constitutional protections that
the Supreme Court of the United States has extended to juveniles and will
explore the relevant history of the juvenile system, particularly in
Maryland. 12 It further will provide an overview on the important role that
jury trials have in the criminal legal system. 13 Part II will examine how
judicial discretion, conditions of confinement, excessive sentences, and the
lack of a jury trial right, violates Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. 14 Part II will also evaluate the policy justifications for
allowing juveniles in Maryland the right to a jury trial and will examine the
rationales of other jurisdictions that have granted juveniles the right to a jury
trial and will apply those rationales to Maryland to conclude that Maryland
law does entitle a juvenile the right to a jury trial. 15
I. BACKGROUND
It has long been held that juveniles facing delinquent charges are entitled
to some of the same constitutional protections that adults facing criminal
charges are entitled to, 16 despite the consensus among state courts that
juvenile proceedings are not criminal proceedings. 17 In Maryland, the state
constitutional protections afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings are
9. MD. CONST. art. 21.
10. MD. CONST. art. 24. “We long ago determined that the phrase, ‘the Law of the land,’
‘mean[s] the same thing’ as ‘due process of law’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.” Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 644, 774 A.2d 1136, 1155 (2001) (quoting Balt. Belt
R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 99, 23 A. 74, 74 (1891)).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See, e.g., In re S.B., 903 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ohio 2009) (“Juvenile delinquency
proceedings are civil . . . proceedings.”); State v. Thompson, 998 P.2d 762, 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(“[J]uvenile adjudications are not criminal proceedings . . . .”).
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found in Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 18
Juveniles are entitled to all of these constitutional protections, except for the
right to a jury trial. 19
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 20 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the right to a jury trial did not extend to juveniles. 21 Despite the
holding in McKeiver, several states granted juveniles the right to a jury trial
during the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile proceeding on the ground that
their respective state constitution afforded juveniles the procedural protection
of a jury trial. 22 In Maryland, this issue has not been considered since
McKeiver was decided. 23 This Part will proceed in four sections. Section A
discusses the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles by the Supreme
Court. Section B explores the history of Maryland’s juvenile system. Section
C discusses Maryland’s modern juvenile system. Finally, Section D
describes the role that jury trials have in the American criminal legal system,
both federally 24 and in Maryland. 25
A. Creating the Foundation: Supreme Court Jurisprudence for
Protecting Juveniles
Although juvenile court systems have been operating since 1899,26
constitutional due process protections for juveniles were not considered until
the late 1960s when courts began to question whether the promises of
rehabilitation and treatment were being fulfilled. 27 The parens patriae
doctrine—a “[s]tate’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizenry” 28—was not being carried out as designed, with “a fatherly judge
18. See MD. CONST. arts. 21, 24.
19. See infra Section II.A.4.
20. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
21. Id. at 545.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See infra text accompanying note 80.
24. See infra Section I.D.1.
25. See infra Section I.D.2.
26. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (noting that although the original
purposes of the juvenile courts may have been aligned with a non-punitive, non-adult ideology,
“critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of
constitutional guaranties applicable to adults”). A task force report for the District of Columbia
alerted the Court to failed rehabilitation efforts, measured by recidivism rates:
In fiscal 1966 approximately [sixty-six] percent of the [sixteen]- and [seventeen]-yearold juveniles referred to the court . . . had been before the court previously. . . . [Sixtyone] percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred
at least once and that [forty-two] percent had been referred at least twice before.
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN D.C., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 773 (1966); infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text (describing the
movement to grant juveniles rights in juvenile trials).
28. Wolinski v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 300, 693 A.2d 30, 37 (1997).
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touch[ing] the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his
problems.” 29 It was only after the Supreme Court recognized “that the child
receives the worst of both worlds,” that certain constitutional protections
were viewed as fundamental for juveniles. 30
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court began
developing procedural protections for juveniles. 31 The starting point was In
re Gault, 32 where juveniles received due process protections for the first
time. 33 In Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was arrested for making lewd
comments, but Gerald’s parents were not notified that their son had been
arrested. 34 The petition alleging Gerald’s delinquent acts was not served on
his parents. 35 Further, at his adjudication hearing, the complainant was not
present to be cross-examined. 36 At the conclusion of the hearing, Gerald was
committed to a juvenile detention facility until he turned twenty-one-yearsold. 37 The Supreme Court held that juveniles had the constitutional right to
timely and adequate written notice, 38 the right to counsel, 39 the right to
confrontation and cross-examination, 40 and the privilege against selfincrimination. 41 The Court reasoned that juveniles were constitutionally
entitled to these rights because they faced incarceration if found to be
delinquent. 42 The Court stressed that “[t]he essential difference between
Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults
were discarded in Gerald’s case.” 43

29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
30. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556; see infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text.
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Id. at 30–31.
34. Id. at 4–5.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 33–34 (“Due process of law requires notice . . . which would be deemed
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.”).
39. Id. at 41 (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . requires that in . . . proceedings . . . which may
result in [incarceration] in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child . . . must be notified
of the child’s right to be represented by counsel . . . .”).
40. Id. at 56 (“No reason is suggested or appears for a different rule in respect of sworn
testimony in juvenile courts than in adult tribunals. . . . [C]onfrontation and sworn testimony by
witnesses available for cross-examination [are] essential for a finding of ‘delinquency’ . . . .”).
41. Id. at 49–50 (“[J]uvenile proceedings[,] . . . which may lead to commitment to a state
institution, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.
To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the ‘civil’
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.”).
42. Id. at 50 (“[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one’s will,
whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’”).
43. Id. at 29; see also id. (“The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was
possible because Gerald was [fifteen] years of age instead of over [eighteen].”).
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In In re Winship, 44 the Supreme Court held that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was required in juvenile adjudication hearings. 45 In
Winship, a twelve-year-old boy was found to be delinquent for stealing
money. 46 The delinquency petition asserted that the child’s charge of larceny
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, and while the juvenile
court recognized that the proof present in the case might not establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, it rejected the child’s argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment required such proof in juvenile cases. 47
Prior to the Winship decision, the standard in juvenile delinquency
proceedings nationwide was preponderance of the evidence. 48 The Court
emphasized that criminal charges required a higher burden of persuasion than
civil cases. 49 Since a defendant’s autonomy and freedom are at stake in a
criminal proceeding, the Constitution requires that evidence be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 50 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
reasoned that “[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in
factfinding to protect the . . . adult apply as well to the . . . child.” 51 Rejecting
the lower courts’ interpretations of the issue, the majority emphasized that
the potential loss of liberty in a delinquency disposition was “comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution.” 52 Justice Brennan concluded that a
reasonable doubt standard would not require states to “abandon or displace”
the fundamental principles of the juvenile delinquency system. 53
After Gault and Winship, the Supreme Court stopped extending
constitutional rights to juveniles. 54 In the seminal case of McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, the majority held that trial by jury was not a constitutional
requirement in the adjudicative phase of juvenile proceedings. 55 Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun reasoned that not all rights constitutionally
guaranteed for adults applied to juveniles. 56 For example, because the

44. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
45. Id. at 368 (stating the standard “is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a
delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault”).
46. Id. at 360.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 372.
50. Id. at 363–64 (noting that in a prosecution, the criminally accused “has at stake interests of
immense importance”).
51. Id. at 365.
52. Id. at 365–66 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)) (“We made clear . . . that civil
labels . . . do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
courts . . . .” (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 36)).
53. Id. at 367 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 21).
54. See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
55. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court did, however, state in
dicta that individual states were free to develop a jury trial system for juveniles should they so
choose. Id.
56. Id. at 545.
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standard of a juvenile’s due process rights was fundamental fairness and a
jury was not required under fundamental fairness, 57 then juveniles were not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. 58 The McKeiver majority reasoned
that a juvenile jury trial would “place the juvenile squarely in the routine of
the criminal process,” 59 turning delinquency proceedings into a fully
adversarial system. 60 The Court thought that the juvenile system could not
fulfill its rehabilitative goals with a jury trial, 61 not because a jury had the
potential to be harsher on a child than a judge would be, but because
rehabilitation would be impeded by the technical consequences of a jury trial,
including “the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system.” 62
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Sixth Amendment, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, required a jury trial in
juvenile cases because these acts would be punishable if committed by an
adult, who would be entitled to a jury trial. 63 Justice Douglas reasoned that
as a consequence juvenile proceedings were indeed prosecutions for criminal
acts that could result in the juvenile being confined until the age of twentyone. 64 Justice Douglas concluded his dissent by noting that “‘the real
traumatic’ experience of incarceration without due process is ‘the feeling of
being deprived of basic rights.’” 65

57. The Court has not explicitly defined this term, but has stated that “a person . . . would be
at a severe . . . disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged
guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil
case.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted).
58. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. The Supreme Court established that fundamental fairness is
“the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings.” Id.
59. Id. at 547.
60. Id. at 545 (reasoning that by allowing jury trials, there would be no need for a separate
juvenile system because an adversarial process would “put an effective end to what has been the . . .
intimate, informal protective proceeding”).
61. Id. at 547 (stating that the success of the juvenile system depends in large part on the
availability of resources and the dedication of the public to rehabilitating youth offenders, and that
in order to reach the highest success rates, states should be allowed to experiment as they see fit,
without a jury trial requirement “impeding that experimentation”).
62. Id. at 550.
63. Id. at 560–61 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the children in the cases faced a possible
minimum five-year sentence, and stressing that “[n]o adult could be denied a jury trial in those
circumstances”).
64. Id. at 558–59 (noting the discrepancy in the cases where “[t]he trial judge stated that the
hearings were juvenile hearings, not criminal trials. But the issue in each case was whether they
had violated a state criminal law.”).
65. Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
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B. Establishing the Juvenile Causes Act: History of Maryland’s
Juvenile Justice System
Historically, Maryland did not distinguish between the treatment and
punishment of juveniles and adults within the criminal legal system. 66 “All
persons, regardless of age, had an absolute right to a jury trial for all but petty
offenses.” 67 Chicago created the country’s first juvenile court system in
1899, 68 and Maryland followed in 1902. 69 The new system was created to
ensure that the juvenile court applied the parens patriae doctrine to juvenile
proceedings by focusing on the youth’s “need for protection or
rehabilitation,” rather than on the youth’s guilt. 70
In 1969, the Maryland General Assembly passed a comprehensive set
of laws, known today as the Juvenile Causes Act and codified at Annotated
Code of Maryland, Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
section 3-8A, 71 to further protect the rights of juveniles in court. 72 The
overarching goal of the Juvenile Causes Act is to rehabilitate youthful
offenders so that they can become productive members of society. 73 The
Court of Special Appeals found that in so passing this Act, the legislature
intended to retain the principles that the juvenile system was founded upon
and preserve juvenile proceedings as non-punitive. 74 That same year, but two
years before the McKeiver decision, the Court of Appeals held in In re
Johnson 75 that juveniles in Maryland had no right to a jury trial. 76 The court
reasoned that while the majority in Gault held that due process standards
were applicable to juvenile proceedings, the Gault majority did not “say that
all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights need necessarily be applicable” to
juvenile proceedings. 77

66. In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969) (explaining that “children were
treated as persons. Children under the age of seven . . . were incapable of criminal intent . . . .
Children above that age were treated as adults. They were given the same legal protections and the
same punishments as adults.”).
67. Id. (citing Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 A.965 (1889)).
68. Id. at 522, 255 A.2d at 422 (“The reform movement brought about the enactment of special
statutory provisions for the handling of juvenile offenders. Illinois, which adopted its Juvenile Court
Act in 1899 . . . was the first to embrace the reform . . . .”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A (West 2011).
72. In re Johnson, 254 Md. at 523, 255 A.2d at 422. See Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md. App.
580, 598, 843 A.2d 915, 926 (2004) (“Under the Juvenile Causes Act, juveniles who, in the absence
of the juvenile justice system, would be prosecuted in, and punished by, the adult criminal justice
system, are instead afforded supervision and treatment, with the aim to achieve rehabilitation.”).
73. Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md. App. at 598, 843 A.2d at 926.
74. In re Hamill, 10 Md. App. 586, 590, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (1970).
75. 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969).
76. Id. at 531, 255 A.2d at 426.
77. Id. at 524–25, 255 A.2d at 423 (alteration in original).
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In 1967, fourteen-year-old Thomas Johnson was found to be delinquent
for allegedly striking and kicking a police officer. 78 Johnson filed a motion
for a jury trial, which was denied, and was placed on indefinite probation. 79
As the seminal appellate decision addressing the right to a juvenile jury trial,
both before and after the McKeiver decision, the Johnson court held that
Maryland’s statutory scheme creating the system of juvenile courts was not
unconstitutional for its failure to provide for a jury trial. 80 The court did
acknowledge, however, the shortcomings of the juvenile system and its need
for reform. 81 The court even recognized that the right to a jury trial in
juvenile delinquency proceedings could one day become practice in
Maryland. 82
In 1997, the Juvenile Causes Act was amended. 83 This amendment
transformed the goals of Maryland’s juvenile system from mere
rehabilitation to a combination of goals, including public safety and juvenile
accountability. 84 Despite this shift in ideology, Maryland’s highest court still
considered the juvenile system to be civil, while acknowledging that
juveniles were still afforded some of the constitutional protections that adults
were afforded in criminal cases. 85 Retaining the due process and fair
treatment principles from Gault, the Court of Appeals applied the
fundamental fairness standard, and concluded that juveniles in Maryland
have the constitutional right to a speedy trial. 86 At this point, juveniles are
entitled to all of the constitutional rights afforded to adults through the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, except for the right to a jury trial. 87

78. Id. at 519, 255 A.2d at 420.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 517, 255 A.2d at 419.
81. Id. at 524, 255 A.2d at 423 (observing that in spite of the attempt to create a juvenile system
that reformers originally imagined, “a wave of disenchantment has been developing for more than
a decade—the result of public awareness . . . that there is substantial opinion that major revisions of
the system are in order”).
82. Id. at 531, 255 A.2d at 426 (“Such a mechanism is not without a certain attractiveness, and
could some day become a part of our juvenile practice.”).
83. MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A (West 2011).
84. See generally CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (describing the purposes of the juvenile
system); see also In re Saifu K., 187 Md. App. 395, 409, 978 A.2d 881, 889 (2009) (“According to
bill analyses[,] . . . the 1997 amendment ‘change[d] the purpose of juvenile justice law from that of
protectiveness of children committing delinquent act[s] to one that requires that children be held
responsible for their behavior and accountable to the victim and the community for offenses
committed.’”).
85. In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000).
86. In re Thomas J., 375 Md. 50, 70, 811 A.2d 310, 322 (2002).
87. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-13(g).
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C. The Pledge to Rehabilitate Youthful Offenders: Modern Juvenile
System in Maryland
The juvenile system seeks to balance the goals of public safety,
rehabilitation, and accountability of the child. 88 The current juvenile system
in Maryland has procedures, policies, and standards that are outlined in the
Maryland Code. 89 The Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”), the state
agency that oversees juvenile detention and incarceration, proffers that it
strives to maintain this balance, by “keep[ing] committed and detained youth
safe while delivering services to meet youth needs.” 90
The specific language of Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme has
retained the non-adversarial principles from McKeiver. 91 For example,
phrases such as “[a]djudicatory hearing,” 92 “[d]elinquent act,” 93 and
“[d]isposition hearing” 94 are used. Further, the charging document is called
a “[p]etition” 95 and the alleged delinquent child is called a “[r]espondent.”96
The purposes and goals of the juvenile legal system includes a balance, as
discussed above, of public safety, accountability, and character
development. 97
Once a juvenile is found delinquent, a disposition is held to determine
what level of rehabilitation the juvenile needs and to consider public safety. 98
The court has different options, ranging from putting the child on probation
to committing the child to DJS for an out-of-home placement. 99 Although a
child in the custody of DJS may not be ordered to be detained for more than
three years, the court or other invested party may move to renew the order. 100

88. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
89. See generally CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (describing the purposes of Maryland’s
juvenile system).
90. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DJS 2017–2020 STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2017) [hereinafter DJS
STRATEGIC PLAN].
91. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (describing how providing juveniles with the right to a trial by jury would turn
juvenile proceedings into an adversarial process, necessarily demonstrating that the McKeiver
majority considered juvenile proceedings to be non-adversarial).
92. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(b) (“‘Adjudicatory hearing’ means a hearing . . . to
determine whether the allegations in the petition . . . are true.”).
93. See id. § 3-8A-01(l) (“‘Delinquent act’ means an act which would be a crime if committed
by an adult.”).
94. See id. § 3-8A-01(p) (“‘Disposition hearing’ means a hearing under this subtitle to
determine: (1) Whether a child needs or requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation; and if so (2)
The nature of the guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.”).
95. Id. § 3-8A-01(y).
96. Id. § 3-8A-01(aa).
97. Id. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)(i)–(iii); see supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
98. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-19(c).
99. Id. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(i)–(ii).
100. Id. § 3-8A-24(b).
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The only other restriction to detaining a child is that the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction terminates when the child turns twenty-one. 101
DJS owns and operates facilities statewide, some of which are called
“committed placement” facilities. 102 There are two types of committed
placement facilities. 103 First, “hardware secure” is “[a] facility that relies
primarily on the use of construction and hardware such as locks, bars, and
fences to restrict freedom.” 104 Second, a “staff secure” facility is a
“[r]esidential program[] where youth movement is controlled by staff
supervision.” 105 In 2007, seventeen-year-old Isaiah Simmons, III died at a
staff secure facility after being restrained by staff members. 106 In 2018, the
juvenile court in Maryland committed 825 youth to DJS. 107 The average
length of stay in a secure committed placement was 169 days. 108
D. Protecting the Criminally Accused: Fundamental Right to Trial by
Jury
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 109 and Articles 5, 21, 23,
and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 110 provide Maryland residents
accused of criminal wrongdoing with the right to a jury trial.
1. Fundamental Principles: Federal Constitutional Right
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial,
by an impartial jury.” 111 The Supreme Court has since evaluated this right
according to the seriousness of the offense, 112 holding that certain crimes
considered to be petty are not subject to the jury trial provision. 113 Applying
this standard, the Court has held that an alleged offender who is charged with
an offense must be facing an incarceration period of at least six months to be
101. Id. § 3-8A-24(c).
102. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DOORS TO DETENTION: STATEWIDE DETENTION
UTILIZATION STUDY 7 (2013). Committed placement facilities are facilities where youth are
detained after they have been adjudicated delinquent. Id. at 8.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104–105.
104. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2018 ix (2018)
[hereinafter DJS DATA RESOURCE GUIDE].
105. Id. at xi.
106. State v. Kanavy, 416 Md. 1, 5, 4 A.3d 991, 993 (2010).
107. MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY., H.B. 1344, FISCAL & POLICY NOTE, REG. SESS. (2019),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/hb1344/?ys=2019rs.
108. Id.
109. See infra Section I.D.1.
110. See infra Section I.D.2.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996).
113. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).

24

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 79:14

entitled to a jury trial. 114 The Court reasoned the penalty authorized for a
particular crime is what matters and not the penalty actually imposed. 115
When evaluating the seriousness of the offense, courts must consider the
maximum prison term authorized, on the ground that a longer prison sentence
deprives a person of their liberty more than a shorter sentence. 116
2. In Pari Materia to the Sixth Amendment: Maryland Constitutional
Right
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights grants the accused the right to a jury
trial in criminal proceedings. 117 The legislature has interpreted this right to
mean that an individual must be charged with a crime that provides for
punishment of at least ninety days incarceration in order to be entitled to a
jury trial. 118 Legislative history reveals that one reason for the ninety-day
threshold is “to reduce the number of jury trial prayers.” 119
Maryland appellate courts have interpreted what types of crimes allow
for the constitutional right to a jury trial to attach. 120 Maryland’s highest
court has created a three-factor test to help trial courts determine whether
there is a state constitutional right to a jury trial for a particular offense. 121
These three factors establish that the right to a jury trial does not attach to

114. Id.
115. Id. at 160 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“[T]he defendant was jailed for [sixty]
days, but it was the [ninety]-day authorized punishment on which the Court focused in determining
that the offense was not one for which the Constitution assured trial by jury.”).
116. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 326 (“While penalties such as probation . . . may infringe on a
defendant’s freedom, the deprivation of liberty imposed by imprisonment makes that penalty the
best indicator of whether the legislature considered an offense to be ‘petty’ or ‘serious.’”).
117. See MD. CONST. art. 5(a) (“That the [i]nhabitants of Maryland are entitled to . . . trial by
Jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 21 (“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 23 (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the
Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 24 (explaining due
process as “no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties . . . or, in
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers”).
118. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i) (West 2009).
119. MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, H.B. 615 FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, REG. SESS. 2 (2004),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Search/Legislation?target=/2004rs/billfile/hb0615.htm
(“By establishing a [ninety]-day penalty threshold, the [legislature] attempted to distinguish petty
offenses that under common law . . . did not trigger the right to be tried by a jury from other offenses
to which the constitutional right applied. The [legislature] was trying to define the circumstances
under which a defendant did not have a right to a jury trial . . . in order to reduce the number of jury
trial prayers.”).
120. Cf. State v. Stafford, 160 Md. 385, 387, 153 A.77, 78 (1931) (ruling that the right to a jury
trial attaches to the offenses of assault and battery). But see In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 606 (1880)
(reasoning that there is no right to a jury trial for the offense of vagrancy).
121. Fisher v. State, 305 Md. 357, 365–66, 504 A.2d 626, 629–30 (1986). These factors include
whether the offense has historically been tried before juries or subject to summary jurisdiction;
whether the offense is an infamous crime; and the seriousness of the offense. Id.
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certain minor criminal offenses. 122 The legislature has defined this to include
any offense for which the period of incarceration is not more than ninety
days. 123
The Court of Appeals has established that “[u]nless there is good reason
to do otherwise,” the constitutional provisions of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights “are in pari materia with their federal counterparts.” 124 Thus, the
provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are parallel to federal
constitutional provisions. 125 The court did emphasize, however, that pari
materia “does not mean that the [state] provision will always be interpreted
or applied” in the same way that the parallel federal provision will be
interpreted or applied. 126 Indeed, where fundamental fairness is concerned,
the Court of Appeals has interpreted both Article 21 127 and Article 24 “more
broadly” 128 than the Fourteenth Amendment. 129
Under Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
individuals charged with a crime have the right to notice, counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination, a speedy trial, and an impartial jury.130
Both Maryland, through legislation, 131 and the Supreme Court, through
seminal precedent, 132 maintain that juveniles are entitled to all of these rights,
except for the right to a jury trial.
II. ANALYSIS
Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, juveniles should be granted
Since juveniles
all constitutional protections afforded to adults. 133
adjudicated delinquent are subject to incarceration upon disposition, they are

122. Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 291, 473 A.2d 438, 446 (1984) (noting that nonetheless,
“the state constitutional jury trial right does attach . . . to offenses which historically had been tried
before juries. It also attaches to . . . any offense subject to infamous punishment.”).
123. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i).
124. Allmond v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. 592, 609, 141 A.3d 57, 67 (2016)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in
original).
127. See Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 86 n.11, 741 A.2d 1162, 1188 n.11 (1999) (resolving the
law under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, while noting that “[i]f the Supreme
Court were to rule upon the issue, . . . we certainly would give due and respectful consideration to
it in any future construction of Article 21, but it would not serve, on its own, to alter the declaration
made in this Opinion regarding Article 21”).
128. Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
129. See Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 43, 553 A.2d 233, 242–43 (1989) (affording individuals
accused of crimes with a broader protection than that afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment).
130. MD. CONST. art. 21.
131. See supra Section I.C.
132. See supra Section I.A.
133. See infra Section II.A.4.
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constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. 134 For juveniles facing confinement,
juvenile proceedings are equivalent to criminal proceedings, so juveniles
must be presented with all of the same criminal procedural safeguards as
adults. 135 Further, it is “disingenuous” for scholars to maintain that juvenile
courts do not pursue retribution. 136 Maryland has acknowledged that “a
juvenile committed to a State facility suffers a deprivation of liberty and is
entitled to constitutional protections.” 137
Applying the pari materia doctrine and the precedent from Gault to
Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, juveniles must be
afforded the opportunity for a jury trial. 138 In Gault, the Court noted that
because juveniles are in danger of losing their liberty, juvenile proceedings
are “comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.” 139 If the magnitude
of the outcome for juveniles in adjudicatory proceedings is so acute as to
bring into play all other due process protections, then it must also necessarily
be the case, “by force of the same reasoning,” that the jury trial right be
invoked in juvenile proceedings, which in no manner could “be classified as
a less vital instrument” than the other due process protections. 140
Denying juveniles the right to a jury trial hinders the goals enumerated
in the Maryland Code. 141 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice Brennan,
concurring, reasoned that “[s]tates are not bound to provide jury trials on
demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the
interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve.” 142
Similarly, Maryland courts have emphasized that “[t]he analysis of whether
a particular procedural right is guaranteed to juveniles under the Due Process
Clause centers on whether granting that right would help achieve or serve to
hinder the goals of the juvenile system.” 143 The juvenile process in Maryland
neither adequately protects the interests that jury trials are intended to
serve, 144 nor does it help to achieve the goals of the juvenile system. 145
134. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11.
135. Barry C. Feld, Punishing Kids in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 47 CRIME & JUST. 417,
463–64 (2018).
136. Id. at 464; see also Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice for All: Extending
the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 866 (1994)
(“Despite similarities between juvenile proceedings and criminal trials—both involve persons
accused of criminal conduct and an adjudication in either could lead to incarceration—courts refuse
to equate juvenile proceedings with a criminal trial.”).
137. In re Virgil M., 46 Md. App. 654, 658, 421 A.2d 105, 107–08 (1980).
138. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
139. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
140. Larsen, supra note 136, at 872 (quoting Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 460–
61 (Ky. 1968)).
141. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
142. 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451, 466, 139 A.3d 1073, 1082 (2016).
144. See supra Section I.D.
145. See supra Sections I.B. and I.C.
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Under Maryland law, juveniles get “the worst of both worlds.” 146 What
opponents are failing to realize is that providing juveniles with another
protection does not equate to turning the juvenile system into a fully
adversarial process. 147 Rather, by augmenting rehabilitation with due process
protections, the juvenile court offers juveniles “treatment and protection—
the best of both worlds.” 148
This Part proceeds in three Sections. Section A explores the ways in
which denying juveniles the right to a jury trial violates Articles 21 and 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, such as through judicial discretion, 149
conditions of confinement, 150 excessive sentences, 151 and the denial of all due
process rights afforded to adults. 152 Section B evaluates the policy
justifications for allowing juveniles the right to a jury trial, including the
arguments that the McKeiver rationale no longer applies 153 and that the
juvenile system in Maryland is not rehabilitative. 154 Finally, Section C
analyzes the arguments of three jurisdictions that allow juvenile jury trials
and applies these arguments to Maryland law. 155
A. Unconstitutionality of Failing to Protect Juveniles’ Fundamental
Rights
A jury trial adds a layer of protection between adjudication and
disposition, allowing juveniles a greater chance of not being incarcerated in
the first place. First, juvenile courts have wide discretion in deciding whether
to incarcerate a juvenile or allow them to receive services in the
community. 156 Second, harsh and punitive conditions of confinement exist

146. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
147. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“There is a possibility . . . that
the jury trial, if required . . . will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process . . . .”). For more recent opinions about the dangers of granting juveniles the right to a jury
trial, see State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. 2002) (continuing to deny juveniles in Louisiana
the right to a jury trial, noting that “[a]rguments claiming that particular statutory schemes are so
punitive and have little or no rehabilitative focus so as to render McKeiver inapplicable have
been . . . unavailing”); In re A.C., 43 A.3d 454, 461–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2012) (“To expand
even further the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process by requesting jury trails in juvenile
matters would effectively result in there no longer being a need for a separate process for them at
all.”); State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250, 1252 (Wash. 2008) (noting that jury trials are reserved for
punitive and adversarial criminal systems, characteristics lacking in the juvenile system).
148. Larsen, supra note 136, at 874.
149. See infra Section II.A.1.
150. See infra Section II.A.2.
151. See infra Section II.A.3.
152. See infra Section II.A.4.
153. See infra Section II.B.1.
154. See infra Section II.B.2.
155. See infra Section II.C.
156. Services in the community include evidence-based treatment modalities, such as
wraparound services, functional family therapy, mental health treatment, and substance abuse
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in DJS-operated placements. 157 Third, juveniles face the risk of being
incarcerated for a longer period of time than an adult who is convicted of the
same offense. 158 Finally, juveniles are entitled to every constitutional right
afforded to adults, except for the fundamental right of trial by jury. 159
1. Unfettered Judicial Discretion
Jury deliberations—a group decision-making process—serve as a
protection against judicial discretion and bias. 160 Juvenile courts in Maryland
control where to send a juvenile, 161 meaning that juvenile court judges have
unfettered discretion in choosing whether to even incarcerate a juvenile. 162
This judicial discretion violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights because it “deprive[s]” a juvenile “of his . . . liberty” without “the
judgment of his peers.” 163 Jury trials provide a check on juvenile judges’
discretion. 164 The Supreme Court alluded to this check when it stressed that
the constitutional jury trial provisions echo an essential principle about the
practice of official power in the criminal legal system and society’s hesitancy
to allow one judge to have unlimited power, as opposed to a jury, composed
of a group of judges. 165
A judge has a more expansive role in juvenile court proceedings than in
adult court proceedings. 166 This expansive role is not because lawmakers
think that a judge might be more understanding and knowledgeable than a
jury about the struggles a juvenile has gone through, but instead is based

counseling. MD. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
GAP ANALYSIS 2 (2013); see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 173–178 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 188–195 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text.
160. See Prescott Loveland, Acknowledging and Protecting Against Judicial Bias at FactFinding in Juvenile Court, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 305 (2017) (“Subtle but dangerous biases
such as situational biases . . . and implicit racial biases are ‘most likely to be uncovered—and
corrected—by means of an interchange between individuals with conflicting perspectives, such as
what typically occurs during a jury deliberation.’” (internal citation omitted)).
161. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(iii) (West 2011). Judges have
discretion as to what level of care is in a juvenile’s “best interest.” Id. For example, a judge may
choose to send a juvenile to a hardware secure facility or a staff secure facility but does not designate
the individual facility that a juvenile will go to. That is within DJS’s power. Id. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(ii).
162. There are no mandatory or statutory maximums, so the juvenile judge is the one who
decides whether an individual will be incarcerated or will receive services in the community. See
id. § 3-8A-24(a) (“[A]n order under this subtitle vesting legal custody in [a juvenile] is effective for
an indeterminate period of time.”).
163. MD. CONST. art. 24.
164. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.
165. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
166. See Loveland, supra note 160, at 288 (describing the judge’s role as one that is “all
encompassing: managing the case, learning about the juvenile’s life, ruling on evidentiary disputes,
sentencing juveniles, and also—despite all the inadmissible information the judge was privy to—
adjudicating guilt through bench trials rather than jury trials”).
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solely on the McKeiver rationale that juries would turn juvenile proceedings
into a fully adversarial process. 167 Yet this rationale lacks merit. Not only
are judges more likely to convict than juries, 168 but the juvenile system in
Maryland is already fully adversarial. 169 To sum up the harmful effect that
judicial discretion plays in a disposition, the law presumes that judges acting
as the finder-of-fact at a bench trial are skilled at setting inadmissible
evidence from pre-trial proceedings aside and making a neutral and objective
decision. 170
2. Deplorable Conditions of Youth Confinement
Since the procedures in juvenile courts are supposedly not as rigorous
and thorough as the procedures in adult courts, there must be “limitations
upon the conditions under which the state may confine the juveniles.” 171 If
Maryland lawmakers contend that the juvenile system is distinct from the
criminal system, demonstrated by the fact that no legislation speaking to
juvenile justice reform in this context has been introduced in Maryland, then
it should necessarily be the case that the conditions of confinement in DJSoperated facilities are distinct from conditions of confinement in Maryland
jails. The data, however, do not bear this out. 172
In July 2019, the Juvenile Justice Monitoring Unit (“JJMU”) described
the Victor Cullen Center (“Cullen”) 173 as having a “prison-like culture . . .
and the absence of an overarching . . . rehabilitation model.” 174 Faculty at
Cullen did not adhere to seclusion policies. 175 For example, while the youth
167. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
168. See Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences
in Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 48 (2008) (describing the acquittal rates between
juries and judges, noting that “juries go from being [fifty] percent more likely to acquit when the
defendant and a witness testify to being [ninety] percent more likely when the defendant also has
no criminal record”).
169. See infra notes 219–222 and accompanying text.
170. Gary Solomon, I Got the Post-McKeiver Blues, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 107 (2007).
171. Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (noting that “[t]his doctrine
has been labelled the ‘right to treatment,’ and finds its basis in the due process clause of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment” and that “[t]he commitment of juveniles to institutions under
conditions and procedures much less rigorous than those required for the conviction and
imprisonment of an adult offender gives rise to [these] limitations”). For example, proponents of
Maryland’s juvenile system may argue that because the rules of evidence do not apply at juvenile
proceedings, the juvenile system is not as rigorous as the adult criminal system. In re Victor B.,
336 Md. 85, 90, 646 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1994).
172. See infra notes 173–181 and accompanying text.
173. Cullen is a hardware secure DJS-operated facility. MD OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT (JJMU), 2019 FIRST QUARTER REPORT 8 (2019) [hereinafter
JJMU REPORT].
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. (finding that the director of Cullen detailed that he should have given his staff members
more clarity regarding placing youth in seclusion, as the youth who were placed in seclusion “did
not present an imminent threat . . . at the time . . . as required by DJS policy for an authorization of
seclusion to occur”).
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were in seclusion, staff members did not regularly check on youth and the
youth were not assessed by mental health or medical staff. 176 At the
Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center (“BCJJC”), JJMU advocates found a
lack of rehabilitation aspects. Concerns at BCJJC included the drastic
increase in the use of seclusion and a lack of mental health staff for the
youth. 177 At BCJJC the average daily population in the first quarter of 2019
was 88 youth per day, but physical restraints were used 100 times, handcuffs
and shackles were used 22 times, and solitary confinement was used 12
times. 178
The goals of Maryland’s juvenile code and the goals of DJS state that
youth should only be committed when absolutely necessary. 179 For example,
in 2018, the juvenile court placed 28.2% of juveniles on probation and
committed 11.8% to DJS placement. 180 Of those committed to DJS
placement, however, the same number of children (405) were committed to
state-operated facilities as were committed to group homes, independent
living, foster care, intermediate care facilities for addictions, and residential
treatment centers combined. 181
The argument that juveniles should be given the right to a jury trial
because of their potential loss of freedom becomes even more imperative
when we consider those 405 children committed to the most restrictive
placements 182—where solitary confinement, shackles, and physical restraints
are common practices. 183 To make matters worse, these deplorable
incarceration conditions have a permanent and debilitating impact on
youthful offenders, which completely undercuts any possibility for
rehabilitation. 184

176. Id.
177. Id. at 38–39.
178. Id. at 38.
179. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15(e)(1) (West 2011) (explaining
“[d]etention . . . may not be continued beyond emergency detention . . . unless, upon an order of
court after a hearing, the court has found that” detention is necessary to protect the juvenile or others,
or the juvenile is likely to leave the court’s jurisdiction); DJS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 90, at 4
(stating one of DJS’s goals as “only us[ing] incarceration when necessary for public safety”).
180. DJS DATA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 22.
181. Id. at 246.
182. Just as being committed to prison, as opposed to jail, results in a greater loss of freedom,
being committed to a more restrictive youth placement, as opposed to a less restrictive setting,
results in a greater loss of freedom. See Patrick McCarthy, Vincent Schiaraldi, & Miriam Shark,
The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to the Youth Prison Model, NEW
THINKING CMTY. CORRS., Oct. 2016, at 1, 2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250142.pdf
(noting that a states’ dependence on “large, congregate facilities has resulted in scandalous abuses,
unconstitutional conditions, and poor public safety outcomes almost since their inception”).
183. JJMU REPORT, supra note 173.
184. Lilah Wolf, Purgatorio: The Enduring Impact of Juvenile Incarceration and a Proposed
Eighth Amendment Solution to Hell on Earth, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 98 (2018); see id. at 97–
98 (“Incarcerated youths’ isolation only augments the impact of maltreatment because they lack the
human connections that encourage positive attachment and self-esteem, undermining their ability
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In the JJMU report, the director of JJMU advised Governor Hogan,
members of the General Assembly, and DJS that Maryland should adopt
other jurisdictions’ practices of closing down large detention facilities and
replacing them with rehabilitation facilities that provide youthful offenders
with individualized treatment plans and services. 185 The reality of DJSoperated facilities is that they are punitive and subject juveniles to
incarceration conditions that are similar to those that adults face. 186
Therefore, juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, because
subjecting juveniles to these incarceration conditions necessarily violates the
Maryland constitutional provision that no one may be “imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold liberties . . . or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers.” 187
3. Juvenile Sentences Are Excessive as Compared to Adult Sentences
The very definition of what constitutes a delinquent act is “an act which
would be a crime if committed by an adult.” 188 Yet because of indeterminate
sentencing in Maryland’s juvenile system, 189 a juvenile may serve a longer
period of incarceration than an adult 190 for the same crime. 191 Juveniles can
be incarcerated until the age of twenty-one, 192 while an adult is incarcerated
until their statutorily-defined penalty is completed. 193 In Maryland, the right
to a jury trial extends to adults who are facing at least ninety days of
to cope with the traumas they experience. The personal relationships so difficult to maintain while
incarcerated also carry a variety of other tangible benefits, for instance helping youths develop selfcontrol and self-confidence.”).
185. JJMU REPORT, supra note 173, at v. By rehabilitation centers that provide services, the
director of JJMU meant that DJS should provide “a continuum of community-based care for youth
in need of intensive services within the health care, child welfare, and juvenile justice systems.” Id.
at 3. Examples include both non-residential facilities and short-term residential facilities. Id. at 4.
186. See supra notes 173–178 and accompanying text. Like DJS-operated facilities, segregation
is also common in Maryland jails and prisons. See DISABILITY RIGHTS MD., BEYOND
INCARCERATION: LOCK DOWN FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 6 (2017) (finding that Maryland
correctional institutions’ use of solitary confinement is almost twice that of the national average).
187. MD. CONST. art. 24.
188. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(l) (West 2011).
189. Cf. JJMU REPORT, supra note 173, at 12. DJS now requires juveniles at Cullen to serve at
least a six-month period of incarceration. Id. Even for those youth who have successfully
completed the program requirements have their stay “arbitrarily extended.” Id. The director of
JJMU emphasized that this form of determinate sentencing “is in direct contravention” to the policy
rationales of having a separate juvenile justice system, because juveniles warrant the protection of
rehabilitation and not “an approach that is exclusively punitive.” Id.
190. See MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., JJMU, 2019 SECOND QUARTER REPORT 5
(2019) (concluding that “[t]he creation of a minimum time period for youth confinement reinforces
the prison-like mentality of ‘doing time’ that is already pervasive at DJS placement sites”). But see
supra note 189 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
192. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-24(c).
193. See, e.g., CRIM. LAW § 3-402(b) (enumerating that the penalty for robbery is imprisonment
for up to fifteen years).
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incarceration. 194 Juvenile confinement often exceeds this ninety-day
standard, as evidenced by the average length of stay of 169 days in 2018. 195
The fact that juveniles may face a longer time incarcerated than an adult
who committed the same offense justifies that juveniles are constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial. Because it would be unconstitutional to deprive an
adult of a jury trial for an offense that carries at least ninety days
incarceration, 196 it is also unconstitutional to deprive a juvenile of a jury trial
for the same offense. The Maryland Declaration of Rights is unambiguous
when it states that no one may be “imprisoned . . . or deprived of his . . .
liberty . . . but by the judgment of his peers.” 197 The legislature has
interpreted the deprivation of liberty to be “imprisonment for a period in
excess of [ninety] days.” 198 Since juveniles may be incarcerated longer than
an adult who committed the same offense and is entitled to a jury trial,
juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.
4. Unconstitutional Denial of All Due Process Protections Afforded
to Adults
The importance of the jury trial in the American legal system cannot be
overstated. “The powers of the criminal jury were the ones our Framers were
most adamant about safeguarding, because . . . there is a heightened need for
protecting individual rights.” 199 Even before Gault, Maryland’s highest court
deemed that persons under the age of eighteen are protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 200 After Gault, Maryland
extended most constitutional rights to juveniles. 201
The right to counsel is so critical in juvenile proceedings that “the
standard for waiver of counsel in a delinquency proceeding is necessarily as

194. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2).
195. See supra text accompanying note 108. To show how common it is for the length of
juvenile incarceration to exceed the ninety-day standard, it is useful to look at the average length of
stay in prior years. In 2017, the average length of stay for youth in a DJS-operated facility was
194.5 days. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2017 138 (2017).
In 2016, the average length of stay was 213.2 days. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE
GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2016 136 (2016). In 2015, the average length of stay was 229.2 days. DEP’T
OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2015 130 (2015). In 2014, the average
length of stay was 204.9 days. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR
2014 128 (2015). In 2013, the average length of stay was 172.5 days. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS.,
DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2013 126 (2013).
196. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)n.
197. MD. CONST. art. 24.
198. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2).
199. Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 852 (2014)
(citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
200. Police Comm’r of Balt. City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 120, 162 A.2d 727, 731
(1960) (citing Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
201. See supra Sections I.B–C.
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strict as the waiver standard that attaches in a criminal case.” 202 Under
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 203 the courts have held that
juveniles are entitled to a speedy trial 204 and fair notice. 205 Due process also
requires that juveniles enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination. 206
Further, juveniles have the right to confrontation and cross-examination, 207
as well as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary standard. 208
Maryland’s highest court has acknowledged that the distinctions between
juvenile proceedings and adult criminal proceedings “have all but
disappeared” because with the exceptions of indictment proceedings and jury
trials, the fundamental rights afforded to adults charged with crimes apply in
juvenile proceedings as well. 209 Despite the progress that Maryland has made
in protecting juveniles, there are still major shortcomings—the fact remains
that juveniles are being unconstitutionally incarcerated and that they are
afforded every single right except the right to a jury trial. 210 Therefore,
juveniles must be provided with all procedural protections that are provided
to adults facing criminal charges.
B. Policy Rationales: Outdated Modalities and Punitive Measures
Although the constitutional reasons for allowing Maryland juveniles the
right to a jury trial should be enough to encourage the legislature to amend
the Juvenile Causes Act, there are also strong policy arguments for allowing
juveniles in Maryland the protection of the jury trial right. First, it has been
202. In re Christopher T., 129 Md. App. 28, 36, 740 A.2d 69, 73 (1999); see also id. at 34, 740
A.2d at 72 (“The fundamental right to counsel unquestionably extends to juveniles . . . .”).
203. MD. CONST. art. 21. For another example of how the Maryland Declaration of Rights
provides more protections for those accused of criminal offenses, see DAN FRIEDMAN, THE
MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION 52 (2011) (“Article 21 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights]
also guarantees that a defendant may only be convicted by a unanimous jury. There is no equivalent
protection under the federal Constitution and, in fact, the Supreme Court has held that there is no
federal constitutional impediment to conviction by a nonunanimous jury.” (internal citation
omitted)).
204. See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70, 811 A.2d 310, 322 (2002) (holding that under the
fundamental fairness standard, both Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause mandate that juveniles be given a speedy trial).
205. See In re Roneika S., 173 Md. App. 577, 588, 920 A.2d 496, 503 (2007) (“In light of Gault,
Winship, and Thomas, the notice provision of Article 21 . . . must apply to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.”).
206. See In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 704–05, 332 A.2d 246, 254 (1975) (“Due Process requires
that various of the federal constitutional guarantees accompanying . . . criminal proceedings, . . .
including the privilege against self-incrimination, be made applicable at the adjudicatory stage of
those juvenile proceedings . . . which may result in confinement of the child . . . .”).
207. See In re Appeal No. 101(76), 34 Md. App. 1, 11, 366 A.2d 392, 398 (1976) (holding that
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
208. See In re Calvin S., 175 Md. App. 516, 537, 930 A.2d 1099, 1110–11 (2007) (“In a
delinquency proceeding, the juvenile court must determine whether the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused juvenile committed the delinquent act . . . .”).
209. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 225, 879 A.2d 695, 701 (2005).
210. See supra Section II.A.2.
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almost fifty years since McKeiver was decided and the Court’s rationale
behind denying juveniles the right to a jury trial no longer applies. 211 Second,
the rehabilitative policies and goals promised by the Maryland General
Assembly and the Department of Juvenile Services are not being fulfilled,
and juveniles in Maryland are not being provided with rehabilitation. 212
1. The Destruction of the McKeiver Principles
Times have changed with respect to the treatment of juveniles, and the
McKeiver rationale no longer applies. 213 The realities of Maryland’s juvenile
system trigger the concerns set out by Justice Douglas in his McKeiver
dissent. 214 Justice Douglas emphasized how even if juveniles were not
incarcerated with adults, those juveniles were being treated as adults in the
first instance by simply being incarcerated at all. 215 This is the reality in
Maryland almost fifty years later. 216 In the past fifteen years, the Supreme
Court has recognized “that children are constitutionally different from adults
for purposes of sentencing,” noting that “they are less deserving of the most
severe punishments.” 217 Even though the Court’s opinions were centered
around the death penalty and life imprisonment, the rationale applies to
juveniles being adjudicated delinquent. 218
This is not to suggest that juvenile disposition deserves the same stature
as capital sentencing, but the Court’s reasoning is relevant because a
juvenile’s disposition is in effect a sentencing proceeding. 219 Coupled with
the reality that conditions of confinement are harsh and retributive, and that
juveniles face the potential of a longer incarceration period than adults, it is
reasonable to conclude that Maryland’s juvenile system is failing to
recognize the Court’s standard that juveniles are less deserving of

211. See infra Section II.B.1.
212. See infra Section II.B.2.
213. See infra Section II.B.2.
214. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
215. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 541, 560 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing how one juvenile judge described a facility as “a maximum security prison for
adjudicated delinquents” (quoting In re Bethea, 257 A.2d 368, 369 (Pa. 1969))). In Maryland,
juveniles cannot be confined with adults. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15(g) (West
2011).
216. See supra Section II.A.2.
217. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
218. The rationale from Miller is applicable to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings because the
Court’s reasoning for the holding, namely that juveniles are inherently different than adults, applies
to all justice-involved juveniles. See Piper Waldron, Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama’s
Implications for Individualized Review in Juvenile Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 783–84
(2013) (describing how all youth, not just youth who commit the most serious of crimes once subject
to the death penalty, have psychosocial and biological “attributes” that necessitate judges to treat
juveniles differently than adults for sentencing purposes).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.

2020]

JUVENILE IN JUSTICE: A LOOK AT MARYLAND

35

punishment than adults. 220 The underlying principle that McKeiver was
decided upon—that the juvenile system is distinct from the adult criminal
system 221—has been destroyed. Maryland needs to follow in pari materia
with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that juveniles are in need of more
protection than adults. 222 Maryland must also go above the federal floor by
interpreting Articles 21 and 24 more broadly than the Fourteenth
Amendment 223 and granting juveniles the right to a jury trial.
2. False Picture of Rehabilitation
The entire rationale behind the creation and maintenance of a juvenile
system is that juveniles are in need of rehabilitation, not punishment. 224 Since
juveniles in Maryland “bargain[] away” their constitutional rights in light of
the system’s promise of rehabilitation, the state is obligated to do just that,
actually rehabilitate the juvenile offender. 225 The juvenile delinquency laws
in Maryland suggest that the juvenile system remains focused on
rehabilitation, 226 but the reality does not complement the laws and policies
currently in place. 227
One does not need to be a social scientist to conclude that rehabilitation
should reduce recidivism rates. It seems logical when statistical analyses
provide that states who focus on rehabilitating youthful offenders have lower
recidivism rates for juvenile delinquent acts. 228 Yet Maryland, a state that
claims to be committed to the rehabilitation of juveniles, does not have
220. It must necessarily be the case that if the Court feels that juveniles are less deserving of the
most severe punishments, then they are less deserving of less severe punishments as well. See supra
note 218 and accompanying text.
221. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
222. See supra text accompanying note 217.
223. See supra note 128.
224. See supra Section I.A.
225. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 7:7, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2020).
226. See supra Section I.C.
227. See Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken,
72 MD. L. REV. 607, 675 (2013). Professor Sterling states:
Two popular misperceptions of juvenile court allow discretion to flourish unchecked.
The first misconception is that any given state’s juvenile court system . . . is geared
primarily to support the rehabilitation of a system-involved youth. While this was
perhaps true in the first decades of juvenile court’s existence, as of 1997, seventeen states
had changed the purpose clauses of their juvenile codes to incorporate goals of
punishment, accountability, and public safety—goals traditionally reserved for the
criminal justice system. And “[a]lthough many jurisdictions still retain language
suggesting rehabilitation as a goal, only three states emphasize the best interests of the
child as the primary purpose of the juvenile court.”
Id. (footnotes omitted). Maryland is not one of these three states.
228. C. Phillip Nichols, Jr., Best Practices Around the Country and in Maryland, MD. B.J., Sept.
2016, 24, 28 (describing that in Missouri “of the 813 juveniles that were discharged from Missouri
[Division of Youth Services] in 2014, only 4.3 percent were recommitted, 0.9 percent were
incarcerated as adults, and 7.2 percent were either placed on probation or 120-day treatment,
resulting in a recidivism rate of only 12.3 percent within one year of discharge”).
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recidivism rates that reflect rehabilitation. 229 In 2015, of the 1142 children
released from committed programs, 10.5% were reconvicted within six
months of their release, 18.7% within twelve months, 29.9% within twentyfour months, and 35.1% within thirty-six months. 230
In 2016, 208 children were released from group homes, and 347 children
were released from state-operated facilities. 231 Of the children released from
group homes, 40.9% of youth were rearrested within a year of their release,
15.4% were reconvicted, and 10.6% were reincarcerated. 232 Of the children
released from state-operated facilities, 53.6% were rearrested within a year
of their release, 26.2% were reconvicted, and 21.0% were reincarcerated. 233
These numbers show that not only are recidivism rates for any type of
placement in Maryland contraindicated to the supposed rehabilitation taking
place, but the more secure (jail-like) the placement, the higher the recidivism
rates. 234 Even if one argues that the Maryland juvenile system is
rehabilitative, it still does not lead to the conclusion that “our benevolent
purposes justify deprivation of rights applicable to adult prosecutions.” 235
C. Jury Trial Rights for Juveniles in Other States 236
As early as 1971, states began affording juveniles the right to a jury
trial. 237 In RLR v. State, 238 the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the
purposes of the right to a trial by jury applied as much in juvenile cases as it
did in criminal proceedings. 239 The court reasoned that the phrase “‘criminal
prosecution[]’ under the Alaska constitutional jury trial [right] . . . include[d]
any offense a direct penalty for which may be incarceration in a jail or penal
institution.” 240 The court applied this definition to RLR’s case, analyzing
that the minor delinquent’s behaviors constituted an offense because the sale
229. See infra text accompanying note 230.
230. DJS DATA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 187.
231. Id. at 198.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 229–233 for statistics.
235. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 31 (Alaska 1971).
236. As of July 2014, eighteen states grant juveniles the right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings, albeit some on conditional grounds. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Juvenile Right to Jury
Trial Chart, NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR. (July 17, 2014), https://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/Right-to-Jury-Trial-Chart-7-18-14.pdf.
237. See infra text accompanying notes 238–243.
238. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
239. Id. at 32 (“The purposes of the right to jury trial . . . such as protection ‘against the
corrupt . . . prosecutor and against the . . . biased . . . judge,’ apply as much in children’s cases as in
adults’ cases.” (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968))).
240. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402
(Alaska 1970)).
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of LSD is a crime under Alaska’s statutory provisions. Further, RLR would
be subject to incarceration upon disposition. 241 The court concluded by
stressing that to treat the “adjudicat[ory] phase of a [juvenile] proceeding for
the sale of LSD differently from” a criminal adult proceeding for jury trial
right purposes “would be a cynical and unprincipled refusal to obey the
Alaska constitution.” 242
The Alaska Supreme Court held that a child who is charged with an
offense that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult and
subsequently subjected to incarceration, the state constitution guarantees that
child a right to a jury trial. 243 In In re L.M., 244 the Kansas Supreme Court
held that because the Kansas juvenile code had become akin to the adult
criminal system and was used as a punitive tool, juveniles had the state
constitutional right to a jury trial. 245 In interpreting a juvenile’s right to a jury
trial under the Kansas Constitution, the court looked at the plain language,
which extended the jury trial right “to all prosecutions.” 246 The court had
before understood this language to “‘mean all criminal prosecutions for
violations of the laws of the state.’” 247 Applying this precedent to juveniles,
the court reasoned that not only did the Kansas juvenile code frequently call
its proceedings a prosecution, but that these proceedings resulted from claims
that a juvenile had broken the criminal laws of Kansas. 248 The court
concluded that the proceedings of the Kansas juvenile code fit within the
meaning of “all prosecutions,” and therefore juveniles were entitled to a jury
trial. 249
The decisions from Alaska and Kansas’s highest courts indicate a slowmoving trend among the states to grant juveniles the right to a jury trial, but
a trend, nonetheless. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
mirrors the language of both the Alaska and Kansas Constitutions that have
been the ground for granting juveniles the right to a jury trial. Therefore, the
reasoning applied by the courts in these two jurisdictions should be applied
to Maryland law, because the very definition of a delinquent act in Maryland

241. Id. at 32–33.
242. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
243. Id.
244. 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008).
245. Id. at 172; see id. at 168 (noting that the juvenile code, once focused on rehabilitation, “has
shifted to protecting the public, holding juveniles accountable for their behavior and choices”). The
court determined that the Kansas juvenile code had been used as a punitive tool by analyzing the
language of the statutes. Id. For example, the court noted that under the juvenile code, “a juvenile
is required to plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere like adults charged with a crime.” Id. The
code also refers to juvenile commitment as incarceration and courts are required to follow a
sentencing matrix, similar to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 169.
246. Id. at 171 (citation omitted).
247. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Mayer v. Pinkerton, 340 P.2d 393 (1959)).
248. Id. at 172.
249. Id.
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is “an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.” 250 Further, just
as Alaska’s highest court has held that “contemporary social values rather
than historical categorizations determine whether a prosecution is criminal
for purposes of the right to jury trial,” 251 Maryland’s highest court has
reasoned that “the Maryland cases have determined whether a juvenile
proceeding should be treated as a criminal prosecution for purposes of a
specific right guaranteed by Maryland law.” 252
Like the Kansas Constitution, Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution
provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury.” 253 The Maryland Court of Appeals has
interpreted the phrase “all criminal prosecutions” to “guarantee[] a right that
is absolute in the sense that it applies to all criminal prosecutions or . . . to the
prosecution of every crime.” 254 As Article 21 is parallel in language to both
the Alaska and Kansas Constitutions, and because both of these jurisdictions
granted juveniles the right to a jury trial on state constitutional grounds, it is
reasonable for Maryland to follow this line of reasoning and grant juveniles
the right to a jury trial. 255 The policy arguments emphasized in In re L.M. are
also applicable to Maryland’s modern juvenile system. 256
Although Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme does not refer to
juvenile proceedings as criminal prosecutions, 257 the specific terminology
used does not make a difference because the proceedings themselves operate
as a criminal prosecution. 258 Before McKeiver was decided, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held in Peyton v. Nord 259 that “[a] juvenile charged
with violation of a state law . . . is entitled to a trial by jury in juvenile
court.” 260 The court reasoned that when the state constitution was adopted,
Albert Peyton could not have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
without a jury trial. 261 Based on this historical context, the court declared

250. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(l) (West 2011).
251. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 32 (Alaska 1971).
252. In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 58, 811 A.2d 310, 315 (2002).
253. MD. CONST. art 21.
254. State v. Allen, 423 Md. 208, 224, 31 A.3d 476, 486 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 895 (3d Cir. 1994)).
255. See supra notes 237–254 and accompanying text.
256. See Brief for Appellant at 24, In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008) (No. 06–96197–A)
(noting how juveniles “face a very different situation than that which existed in 1971 when
McKeiver was decided,” as apparent by the Kansas juvenile code becoming akin to the adult
criminal code, “both in form and underlying philosophy,” and by the Kansas juvenile code’s “goals
of public safety and juvenile accountability” becoming “seemingly more important than
rehabilitation”).
257. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(b) (West 2011) (referring to the
proceedings as adjudications).
258. See supra notes 200–210 and accompanying text.
259. 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968).
260. Id. at 725.
261. Id. at 723.
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that a mere “change in terminology or procedure” was not commensurate
with a court denying Albert a jury trial and subsequently sentencing him to
incarceration. 262
Like juveniles in New Mexico at the time of the adoption of the state
constitution, juveniles in Maryland, at the time of the adoption of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, had the right to a jury trial. 263 Therefore,
the fact that juveniles had the right to a jury trial at the time of the adoption
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights logically takes precedent over what
the state legislature has chosen to call juvenile proceedings. Maryland needs
to follow in line with states like Alaska, Kansas, and New Mexico, and grant
juveniles the right to a jury trial.
III. CONCLUSION
Juvenile incarceration in Maryland is so egregious and punitive that one
young child died after being restrained by DJS staff. 264 In 2007, seventeenyear-old Isaiah Simmons, III died at a staff secure facility after being
restrained by staff members. 265 Disguised under a false premise of
rehabilitation, with softer terminology and non-punitive policies, Maryland’s
juvenile system is harmful for Maryland youth because it has resulted in
“judges ruling for fewer procedural protections for juveniles.” 266 In
Maryland the right to a jury trial is so critical that “[t]o satisfy constitutional
due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute
an intentional relinquishment.” 267 Yet children today are denied this
fundamental right.
Each injustice discussed in this Comment—judicial discretion in
placing the child, 268 conditions of confinement, 269 excessive sentences, 270 and
262. Id.
263. In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969) (“Until the beginning of this
century, Maryland made no distinction in regard to the manner in which criminal offenders, whether
they be adults or minors, were tried.”).
264. See State v. Kanavy, 416 Md. 1, 9, 4 A.3d 991, 995 (2010) (“When the state by . . . its
power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs[,] . . . it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by . . . the Due Process Clause.” (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebogo Cty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989))).
265. Kanavy, 416 Md. at 5, 4 A.3d at 993.
266. Michael J. Ritter, Just (Juvenile Justice) Jargon: An Argument for Terminological
Uniformity Between the Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 237 (2010).
The author further notes “that legal changes in the past few decades have transformed these once
persuasive rhetorical strategies into mere vestiges that undermine the goals of the juvenile justice
system.” Id. at 224.
267. Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 234–35, 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981) (citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
268. See supra Section II.A.1.
269. See supra Section II.A.2.
270. See supra Section II.A.3.
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being denied all due process rights afforded to adults 271—is by itself enough
to extend the constitutional protection of jury trials to juveniles. Yet taken in
the aggregate, the reality becomes undeniably clear that juveniles are entitled
to a jury trial under Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

271. See supra Section II.A.4.

